Localization economies and the sensitivity of firm foundations to changes in taxation and public expenditure by Wittrock, Christian
Localization Economies and the 
Sensitivity of Firm Foundations to 
Changes in Taxation and Public 
Expenditures
WP18/21
The paper is circulated for discussion purposes only, contents should be considered preliminary and are not to 
be quoted or reproduced without the author’s permission.
December 2018
Christian Wittrock
Ruhr-University Bochum and TU Dortmund
Working paper series | 
2018
Localization Economies and the Sensitivity of
Firm Foundations to Changes in Taxation and
Public Expenditures∗
Christian Wittrock†
Abstract
This paper investigates the influence of tax rates and public expenditures on the num-
ber of firm foundations in West German municipalities in the presence of localization
economies. Brülhart et al. (2012) use Swiss data to show that localization economies
can mitigate the negative effects of taxation on firm foundation rates. Firms are more
willing to accept higher tax rates if localization economies within their industry exist
that generate beneficial spillover effects. These agglomeration rents can be taxed
by municipalities (see Koh et al. 2013) and localities can use additional revenues for
public spending. This work exploits information on the localization of German in-
dustries on a 2 digit level based on work by Koh and Riedel (2014). It is combined
with detailed data on the number of firm foundations, the local business tax rate
and public expenditures in West German municipalities to analyze the sensitivity of
firm foundations to changes in the local tax rate and public spending with respect
to localization economies. Similar to Brülhart et al. (2012) the results for Germany
imply that increasing localization of an industry diminishes the negative effect of
business taxation at a given location. On top, the results show that the positive
effect of public expenditures (namely economic promotion and municipalities total
capital stock) is mitigated by localization economies.
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I. Introduction
Economic activity is not equally distributed across space. Since Marshall (1890)
economist are searching for answers about the determinants of firms location de-
cision. Most notably, starting with Krugman’s (1991) work on the “new economic
geography” many contributions to the literature discussed the effects of agglomer-
ation economies. Agglomeration creates incentives for mobile investment to seek
proximity to benefit from spillovers. These spillovers can be classified into two main
types (1) localization economies (see Marshall 1890, Arrow 1962, Romer 1986) and
(2) urbanization economies (Jacobs 1969). Localization economies increase produc-
tivity of firms with increasing size of an industry in a geographical location e.g. by
knowledge spillovers of firms within close distance that are spatially concentrated
(see Audretsch and Feldman 1996, for R&D spillovers). Marshall (1890) and Krug-
man (1991) argue that these spillovers might be geographically bounded with the
costs of transmitting information increasing with distance. Urbanization economies
benefits firms locating in a region and increase with the size of the region e.g. by
better access to a larger labor force (see Rosenthal and Strange 2004, for a discus-
sion). The first is beneficial for firms in the same industry and the latter is beneficial
for all firms (Maurel and Sédillot 1999). Depending on the dominance of a spillover
either specialized areas or industrially diversified areas emerge (Jacobs 1969). More
importantly, if firms benefit from locating close to each other this can affect the
sensitivity of firms to location characteristics (see Brülhart et al. 2012) and create
possibilities for municipalities to tax agglomeration rents (see Koh et al. 2013). The
standard theory of tax competition states that increasing firm mobility results in
a race to the bottom of corporate taxes (see Wilson 1999, for a review). Simul-
taneously, this result remains and open discussion in the empirical literature using
localities in Germany (see e.g. Buettner 2003, Baskaran 2014). A number of theoret-
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ical contributions discuss the interacting effects of agglomeration and the local tax
setting (see e.g Kind et al. 2000, Ludema and Wooton 2000, Andersson and Forslid
2003, Baldwin and Krugman 2004, Borck and Pflüger 2006, Baldwin and Okubo
2009). This paper aims to analyze the sensitivity of firms location decisions with
respect to localization economies. More specific, following a recent contribution by
Brülhart et al. (2012) this paper aims to analyze the effects of localization economies
on the sensitivity of firm foundation rates to changes of the local business tax. On
top, I will contribute adding an analysis of the localization sensitivity of firm foun-
dation rates to public expenditures. Devereux et al. (2007) show for a model of
plant location in Great-Britain that agglomeration externalities have an effect on
the responsiveness of firms to fiscal incentives. In detail, they show that fiscal in-
centives have a greater impact in regions with a larger stock of existing plants. The
authors do not explicitly model the effect of localization and fiscal incentives on firm
births. Note that the literature on these interaction effects is scarce. This paper will
contribute exploiting rich data on firm foundation rates, public expenditures and
local business taxation in West German municipalities from 1998 to 2006. First, the
data allows to replicate the results of Brülhart et al. (2012) for German data and
to review their results. Second, the data allows to explicitly address the interaction
effects of localization and public expenditures on the number of firm foundations.
Following Brülhart et al. (2012) and Guimarães et al. (2003) the decision pro-
cess of firms location choice can be modeled and estimated using a Poisson model.
Hence, using detailed data on firm foundation, taxation and public expenditures in
a Poisson model I can explicitly address the question to what extend local business
taxes and public expenditures affect firm foundation rates. Moreover, it allows to
analyze the sensitivity of both effects to localization economies. I identify a nega-
tive effect of a 1% increase of the mean local business tax on the expected number
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of firm foundations in non-localized industries by 4.4%. On top, the sensitivity of
firm foundations to changes in the local business tax decreases significantly with
increasing localization economies. Thus, a 1% increase of the average local business
tax decreases the expected number of firm foundations in top-localized industries by
1.34%. In contrast, a 1% increase of mean public expenditures (represented by the
capital stock for economic promotion) increases the expected number of firm founda-
tions in non-localized industries by 0.13%. Again, this effect decreases significantly
with increasing localization. A 1% increase of the average economic promotion
capital stock increases the expected number of firm foundations in top-localized in-
dustries by 0.08%. Thus, the negative effects of taxation and the positive effects of
public expenditures are supplanted by localization economies and firm foundations
in strongly localized industries are less sensitive to changes of local taxation and
public expenditures.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section II presents the
institutional background and data necessary to understand the research approach
and the results. The coefficient of localization economies used in this article is
explained in section III. The empirical model, empirical obstacles, results and some
remarks on robustness are discussed in sections IV to VI. Section VII concludes.
II. Institutional Background and Data
The analysis to come will exploit rich data on municipalities in West Germany. Mu-
nicipalities represent the lowest institutional level. They possess the right to govern
themselves (Article 28 of the German constitution) and thus, can independently set
policies to attract mobile capital. The latter will be represented by the number of
firm foundations based on public data called ’Gewerbeanzeigenstatistik ’. Firms are
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Figure 1: Histograms of the Number of Firm Foundations in Germany Municipalities
in 2006.
(a) Number of Firm Foundations (Cut at the
95% Quantile).
(b) Number of Firm Foundations (Maximum
20).
mandatory to register if they set up a new firm or branch in Germany.1 The data
is available for the years 1998 to 2006. Figure (1) depicts the number of new firm
foundations in 2006. A significant mass of municipalities have zero or only one firm
foundation per year. This is based on the fact that many municipalities are small
entities with a low probability of a firm locating there. This probability plays an
important factor understanding the impact of changes in municipalities policies.
Municipalities are mainly funded by three sources. First, some revenues, e.g.
the personal income tax, are collected on the federal state or country level and dis-
tributed among governmental levels (municipalities receive e.g. 15% of the overall
income tax revenues). Second, municipalities set the local property tax and local
business tax multipliers to generate own sources of revenues.2 Third, other sources
of revenues are generated via grants by the federal states or the German govern-
ment.3 Revenues are used for (1) mandatory and (2) voluntary public expenditures.
1Note that the Gewerbeanzeigenstatistik also includes self-employed firms. Our sample of firm
foundations does include all registrations of corporations, partnerships and self-employed firms
with at least 1 employee.
2Note that since 2004 the local business tax multiplier is bound from below by 200.
3Additionally, German municipalities set local taxes or collect fees for various services to generate
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Mandatory expenditures (e.g. social security) is administered by the local govern-
ment while laws regarding this expenditures are made on the federal or state level.
Municipalities are governed by local councils and majors who can decide about the
level of voluntary expenditures e.g. theaters, museums, public parks, local streets,
economic promotion and public investment.
Data for public expenditures is based on detailed accounting information for
municipalities (the so called ’Jahresrechnungsstatistik ’) and available for the years
1992 to 2006. This data contains information about the size and target of public
expenditures. Municipalities do not invest in public expenditures regularly over the
years and expenditures show significant variance over time. Moreover, expenditures
do not necessarily have a one-time impact and can take effect over several years.
To capture these effects I calculate capital stock values using yearly expenditures
and official information about the operating lives of public investment using the
perpetual inventory method.
In detail, the capital stock of public expenditures (henceforth called C) is cal-
culated based on disaggregated accounting data of German municipalities between
1992 to 2006.4 The initial capital stock of a municipality is assumed to be equal to
K0 =
E
ggdp +
1
T
(1)
with E the average expenditures for investment in and construction of public
goods, ggdp the GDP growth rate and T for the average publicly available operating
life. I will assume a GDP growth rate of 2% and linear depreciation of the capital
stock. The capital stock C in municipality i at time t is given by
revenues.
4The data set Jahresrechnungsstatistik is provided by the German statistical offices.
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Ci,t =
T∑
k=0
Ei,t−k
(
1− k
T
)
+ AEi,t (2)
with Ei,t investment and construction expenditures and AEi,t administration ex-
penditures. Note that I assume that administration expenditures depreciate within
one year. Furthermore, expenditures in 1992 (the starting year of the data) are equal
to the capital expenditures plus the initial capital stock K0. Hence, expenditures
before 1992 are assumed to be equal to 0.
Following Devereux et al. (2007) I’m mainly interested in the effects of public
expenditures for economic promotion (represented by the capital stock of economic
promotion) on the number of firm foundations. I expect economic promotion to have
the greatest impact on firm births as they are directly targeted towards firms. The
literature on the effects of public expenditures on firms uses a variety of proxies (see
e.g. Fisher 1997, Sturm et al. 1998, Romp and De Haan 2007). Hence, to control
for the robustness of the results I additionally estimate the effect of the total capital
stock on firm foundations. The total capital stock is the sum of voluntary public
expenditures.5 Additionally, to control for the validity of the capital stock proxy I
moreover estimate the effect of overall current (voluntary) public expenditures on
firm foundations. Both robustness checks do not change the results.
The data is augmented by socio-economic control variables such as population,
the share of low, medium or high qualified employees as well as the tax multiplier
of the local business tax based on the Statistik Lokal or Inkar databases. Overall,
the sample comprises about 8,500 West-German municipalities for the years 1998 to
5Voluntary public expenditures comprise of expenditures for (1) public security, (2) schools, (3)
culture and public education, (4) child- and youth care, (5) health, sport and recreation, (6)
public transportation and parking facilities, (7) public streets, (8) economic promotion, (9) public
construction and housing.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for 2006
Mean Std. Dev. Pctl(25) Pctl(75)
# of Firm Foundations (Full Sample) 7.86 24.49 0.00 6.00
# of Firm Foundations (Log Sample) 11.69 29.03 2.00 10.00
Population in 1000 6.49 16.55 0.72 5.74
Unemployment Rate in % 5.34 1.82 4.00 6.40
Share of Low Skilled Workers in % 17.54 2.95 15.20 19.70
Share of Medium Skilled Workers in % 63.33 3.73 60.60 65.90
Share of High Skilled Workers in % 5.58 2.28 4.20 6.10
Students per 1,000 Inhabitants 5.71 14.56 1.00 3.20
Doctors per 100,000 Inhabitants 131.71 22.57 121.40 138.40
Local Business Tax Multiplier in Points 339.25 31.17 320.00 352.00
Economic Promotion in 1 Million Euro 1.41 5.97 0.06 0.78
Total Stock in 1 Million Euro 29.43 67.44 3.18 29.00
Source: Own data collection and calculations. Notes: The table depicts the sum of
firm foundations over all industries in 2006. The sample covers 8418 municipalities
in the full sample and 5612 municipalities in the log-sample.
2006 and 41 industry classes.6 Descriptive statistics for the year 2006 are provided
in Table (1). The average municipality has approximately 7,500 inhabitants and 8
new firm foundations (in 2006). The average local business tax multiplier is 339
points and the average total capital stock is 30 Million Euro. Approximately 5% is
due to economic promotion. Note that the variation in the total capital stock and
capital stock of economic promotion is high among municipalities.7
III. Localization Index
Localization will be measured using the agglomeration index for Germany proposed
by Koh and Riedel (2014). The index (henceforth called LOC) is calculated using the
method proposed by Duranton and Overman (2005). Based on the Duranton and
6Data for East Germany is available. I concentrate on West-Germany because the sample period
is to close to reunification and economic conditions differ substantially between West- and East
Germany.
7To exclude outliers I drop observations with more than 300,000 inhabitants as well as the city
states Bremen and Hamburg from the analysis.
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Overman (2005) framework an industry is defined as being localized or dispersed if
the distribution of bilateral distances within an industry significantly deviates from
a random distribution of distances. By using a continuous scale to determine ag-
glomeration the LOC index avoids disadvantageous of other indexes e.g. the Gini
Index or the Ellison and Glaeser (EG) index (for the later see Ellison and Glaeser
1997). In contrast to the EG index the LOC index does not assume ex ante allo-
cation of firms. Following Duranton and Overman (2005), EG transforms dots on
a map into units in boxes and deletes large amounts of information while creating
aggregation problems. Among these problems is the restriction to one spatial scale.
While this limits comparability of the agglomeration index between different scales
and hence, differing institutional settings (e.g. countries), scales are normally de-
fined based on administrative and not economic relevance. Furthermore, the EG
index creates a downward bias if agglomeration crosses administrative boundaries.
Additionally, as noted by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) agglomeration indexes have to
control for industrial concentration. Because the number of firms is not arbitrary
large, a random location process cannot generate regular location patterns. The
calculation of the LOC index can be separated into four steps (see Koh and Riedel
2014, for a detailed description).
Step 1: Calculation of the kernel density estimate
Information on the location of companies is used to calculate bilateral euclidean
distances.8 Distances are then used to calculate the density of bilateral distances
8Note that due to confidentiality issues of the data the locations of companies within a municipality
are assumed to be equal to the centroid of the municipality. Hence, distances of firms within the
same municipality are zero. Koh and Riedel (2014) do not expect the calculated LOC index to
be systematically biased. First, the measurement error does occur when calculating distances as
well as counterfactuals. Secondly, the assumption does add unsystematic noise to the LOC index
as distances within a municipality are underestimated and distances between firms of different
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Kˆm(d) at any point (distance) d using
Kˆm(d) =
1
n(n− 1)h
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
f
(
d− di,j
h
)
(3)
with n the number of firms in the industry and f the Gaussian kernel function with
bandwidth (smoothing parameter) h.
Step 2: Constructing counterfactuals
A counterfactual kernel density estimate for each industry m is calculated to
be compared with the estimate of equation (3) to identify significance deviation
from randomness. Koh and Riedel (2014) use the population of all plants located in
Germany and calculate the density estimate given by equation (3) with 1000 draws
to generate 1000 counterfactuals for every industry m.
Step 3: Global confidence bands
For each distance d a Kˆsm˜(d) is picked such that 95% of all randomly generated
distance density functions lie above or below this band generating an upper Kˆm˜(d)
and lower Kˆm˜(d) bound of kernel density estimates.
Step 4: Identification of localized industries
An industry is assumed to be localized if Kˆm(d) > Kˆm(d) or dispersed if Kˆm(d) <
Kˆm(d) for at least one distance d. The localization index is defined as
Γm(d) ≡ max
(
Kˆm(d)− Kˆm(d), 0
)
(4)
municipalities are under- or overestimated.
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Figure 2: Weighted DO Index for Two-Digit Industries.
A larger index indicates stronger localization of industry m. As I’m mostly in-
terested in the effect of taxation and public expenditures on firm foundation rates
within a municipality the following analysis will use the localization index with dis-
tance d = 0. The localization index calculated by Koh and Riedel (2014) is based
on data for the year 1999 while the panel used for estimating firm foundation rates
ranges from 1998 to 2006. Hence, (although unlikely) the results do not capture vari-
ation in the localization due to significant changes in the number of firm foundations
within a municipality. Dumais et al. (2002) report that geographical concentration
is stable despite industry mobility. Therefore, I assume that the localization index
is stable over the sample period.9 Furthermore, the localization index is calculated
9Moreover, to exclude significant variation in localization between the year 1998 and 1999 I re-
peated the estimations on the subsample from 1999 onwards. The results are basically unaffected.
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using 4 digit industry classes. To calculate a localization index on a 2 digit industry
level I calculate the weighted average of the 4-digit localization index weighted with
the number of firms in every industry.10 Figure (2) depicts the localization index
used for the main part of the analysis. Table (2) lists the 5 most and least localized
industries.
Table 2: Most and Least Localized Industries and Weighted LOC Index for Two-
Digit Industries.
Industry Weighted LOC Index
Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.00000
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 0.00001
Wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture 0.00002
Wholesale on a fee or contract basis 0.00002
Rubber and plastic products 0.00003
Service activities for business 0.00187
Scientific research and development 0.00206
Motion picture, video and television programme production 0.00431
Real estate activities 0.00498
Water transport 0.00545
Source: Own data collection and calculations.
As depicted by figure (2) the localization index varies significantly among in-
dustries with water transport showing the highest localization. I control for the
robustness of my results by dropping potential outliers (the top 3 localized indus-
tries (1) water transport, (2) real estate activities and (3) motion picture, video and
television program production) and varying the distance of the localization index as
well as weighting the 4 digit index with industry revenues based on information on
the full set German firms.11
10The number of firms in every industry is based on information of the DAFNE data set provided
by Bureau van Dijk. The data is not available on a municipality level.
11Revenues per industry are based on the DAFNE data set for the year 2009 provided by Bureau
van Dijk.
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IV. Empirical Setup
A. Empirical Model
Following the setup proposed by Brülhart et al. (2012), the process of firm founda-
tions can be modeled as a random profit maximization problem of firm managers
searching for the perfect location to set up a new firm among a given set of locations.
Given the profit pifijt of firm f in industry j, location i at time t a firm will locate
in municipality m if
pifmjt > pifijt ∀ i, i 6= m (5)
The profit may be defined by a deterministic part Uijt and a random error fijt
pifijt = Uijt + fijt. (6)
The deterministic part of the model captures location and industry specific factors. I
assume that the deterministic part is given by a linear relationship of taxes Tit, public
expenditures Cit and socio-economic variables Xijt. Additionally, in the spirit of the
“new economic geography” literature, firms of an industry j locating in a specific
municipality benefit from localization Lj of industry j which effects profits directly
and via the interaction with the tax rate and capital stock.12 In summary, the profit
function (6) can be written as
pifijt = Uijt + fijt = α1Tit + α2TitLj + β1Cit + β2CitLj + γLj + δXijt + fijt. (7)
The coefficients of interest are α1, α2, β1 and β2. Based on previous research on
the effects of taxation on firm foundations I expect α1 to be negative (see Devereux
12Note that I assume that localization affects the sensitivity of firm foundations to changes of the
tax rate or public expenditures. This assumption will be tested in the empirical model. If point
estimates are significant the assumption is valid.
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and Maffini (2007) for a survey). Furthermore, I expect the effect of public expendi-
tures on firm foundations to be positive. Generally speaking, if expenditures have a
positive effect on firms productivity, firms benefit by locating in municipalities with
an optimal amount of expenditures for their operation. Hence, I would identify
a positive and significant point estimate. The coefficients α2 and β2 capture the
interaction effect of localization and the business tax rate or public expenditures.
Given a negative effect of taxation on firm foundations, a positive coefficient α2
represents a decreasing tax effect with stronger localization. Thus, the sensitivity
of firm foundations to changes of the local business tax would be mitigated by in-
creasing localization. This result has been confirmed by Brülhart et al. (2012) using
a sample of firm foundations in Switzerland. The direction of the interaction effect
of localization and expenditures is previously unknown.A positive interaction effect
would indicate that localization effects increase the benefits of the capital stock on
firm productivity. Hence, firm foundations in strongly localized industries would
be more sensitive to changes in public expenditures. A negative interaction effect
implies a decreasing positive effect of public expenditures (if β1 > 0) with increasing
localization economies.
Following McFadden (1974) assuming that the stochastic error follows an extrem-
value type 1 distribution gives the probability of choosing location m as
Pmjt = e
Umjt
(∑
j
eUijt
)−1
. (8)
Furthermore, define
dfijt =
 1 if f chooses i0 otherwise (9)
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and the log-likelihood of the conditional-logit model is given by
ln(L) =
∑
f
∑
i
∑
j
∑
t
dfijtln(pijt) =
∑
i
∑
j
∑
t
nijtln(pijt) (10)
with nijt =
∑
f dfijt the number of firms in municipality i and industry j at time
t.13 The log-likelihood of a Poisson regression on the number of firm foundations
gives the same (up to a constant) log-likelihood function as the conditional-logit
model (see Guimarães et al. (2003) for details). Therefore, the location choice can
be represented by a Poisson regression of
E [nijt|Rijt] = exp (α1Tit + α2TitLj + β1Cit + β2CitLj + δXijt + λi + νj + κt) (11)
with λi municipality, νj industry and κt time fixed effects (absorbing γLj in equation
(7)).14
Following Becker and Henderson (2000) or Figueiredo et al. (2002) the model of
firm birth could also be represented by a model where entrepreneurs are spatially
immobile and repeatedly decide if they want to set up a new firm. Note that the
latter can also be represented by a Poisson model.15
B. Empirical Obstacles
When estimating the empirical model at hand I’m faced with similar obstacles as
Brülhart et al. (2012). Estimating the empirical model assumes exogeneity of all
explanatory variables. The focus of this article is on the (interaction) effects of
13Equation (10) assumes that firm decisions are solely based on industry and location specific
characteristics that are common to all firms.
14Rijt = [Tit, Eit, Lj ,Xijt] being the set of explanatory variables.
15According to Brülhart et al. (2012) this is a considerable advantage given that with limited
information finding the best model for the actual data-generating process is infeasible.
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taxation, public expenditures and localization on firms’ location choice. While tax
rates and public expenditures are likely to affect the number of firm foundations,
the number of firms in a municipality is also likely to effect the tax rate and the level
of expenditures through the local tax base. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests
that the size and number of firms may influence localities’ policies, e.g. by stronger
investments in lobbying. So far, only scarce work testing this hypothesis exist (see
e.g. Brülhart and Simpson 2018, for a recent discussion). By using the count of
new firms registering in a municipality concerns of simultaneity bias with regard to
municipalities policies and thus, the tax rate and expenditures can be mitigated. It
is unlikely that new firms who have not earned any revenues and thus haven’t paid
taxes at the time of birth have a direct effect on the tax rate and expenditures. On
top, lobbying is more likely to occur among established corporations. Nevertheless,
as the count of new firms is dependent on the count of existing firms an indirect
effect might create biased results. This concern is addressed using an instrumental
variable approach instrumenting the local business tax rate and public expenditures.
Moreover, localization is a direct function of the number of firms that are geo-
graphically located. As stated in section III the measure of localization is based on
the stock of firms in 1999 and constant over time. Thus, this obstacle is addressed as
the localization index used for the empirical analysis is independent of the number
of firm foundations.
Equation (11) assumes that the change in the sensitivity to taxation and public
expenditures of the number of firm foundations is linear and continuous. In contrast,
models in the tradition of Krugman (1991) mostly assume a discontinuous relation
between agglomeration and taxation (or public expenditures). If localization exceeds
a specific threshold all firms of a mobile industry locate in one location. Note that
explicitly controlling for non-linearities of the interaction is beyond the scope of this
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article. Nevertheless, the reader should be aware that these non-linearities might
distort the results of the empirical setup.
Additionally, I control for violations of the equidispersion assumption of the
underlying Poisson distribution calculating robust standard errors (see Wooldridge
2010, for a discussion). Specifically, if the equidispersion assumption (E(nijt) =
V ar(nijt)) of the dependent variable is violated the Poisson model generates a false
covariance matrix and hypotheses tests are invalid. By using robust standard errors
this assumption is relaxed and the estimated covariance matrix is valid.
C. Instruments
I will instrument the capital stock using two instruments.
The first exploits variation generated by the ‘Renewable Energy Sources Act’
(RES Act) of 2000. This Act was initiated by the German state to promote energy
production from renewable sources. Among others, the law created heavy subsidies
for firms constructing wind power plants resulting in a substantial increase in the
number of plants across Germany. Wind power plants are subject to local taxation
and directly increase local trade tax and property tax revenues. Note that to max-
imize energy output wind power plants are build in areas with high wind strength
and sufficient free/unpopulated space. The guideline for approving the construction
of wind power plants in Germany formulates that the typical distance of an energy
production area with 7 wind power plants from the next local town should be at
least 1500 meters.
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Figure 3: Quantiles of Mean Wind Strength in 80 Meters Height and Mean Share
of Agricultural Land
(a) Mean Wind Strength in 80m Height (b) Mean Share of Agricultural Land
Notes: The figure depicts the 1% quantiles of wind strength in 80m height and share of agricultural
land in West Germany (federal states are outlined with black lines). Calculations are based on
the year 2006. Darker colors are associated with higher quantiles. There exists a clear difference
between North and South Germany with more wind and agricultural land in Lower Saxony and
Schleswig-Holstein. To address concerns about the differences between federal states I include
state times year fixed effects in the regressions.
To construct the instrument I will use the mean wind strength (from 1981 to
2000) in a height of 80 meters and the total agricultural land in ha of a municipality.
Figure 3 depicts 1% quantiles of both variables. Darker colors are associated with
higher quantiles. The figure suggests that wind strength and agricultural land vary
substantially between localities. The figures imply that localities in the north of
the country (especially in Lower-Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein) are more likely
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to host wind power plants. To construct the instrument, the two variables (wind
and agricultural land) are multiplied with a dummy taking the value 1 after the
year 2000. Further I construct the interactions between both variables. I expect
municipalities with suitable wind power and agricultural land to have benefited from
the renewable energy sources act and hence, the two way interaction serves as the
instrument while I control for mean wind strength after the reform. Additionally,
the instrument is multiplied with a time trend to capture delayed effects.
The local business tax is instrumented using a dummy indicating deviations
from a so-called reference tax rate. Public revenues are redistributed among mu-
nicipalities within federal states to equalize funds per capita and to harmonize the
availability of public goods. Redistribution is based on a complicated system. In
short, the system calculates the financial requirements and the financial potential
of every municipality based on various statistical indicators. Differences between
financial requirements and potentials are then mitigated by fiscal redistribution.
Among other indicators, federal states calculate a reference business tax rate based
on the potential taxable capacity for every municipality. Hence, if municipalities
set a low business tax rate to attract mobile capital the potential loss in business
tax revenues is not necessarily negated with fiscal redistribution as the federal gov-
ernment assumes that the local business tax rate could have been higher and the
difference between financial requirement and potential can be mitigated by a higher
tax rate. The instrument is a dummy indicating if the local business tax in 1998 was
below or above the actual reference tax rate. If the reference tax rate exceeds (falls
short from) the local business tax in 1998, local business tax rates are expected to
have increased (fallen) to mitigate the difference between financial requirement and
potential. I control for the robustness of the instrument by adding state times year
fixed effects to validate if variation within states and year of the dummy is sufficient
18
to instrument the business tax rate.
V. Empirical Results
In what follows I will present the empirical results. As outlined in section IV the
process of firm foundations can be represented by a log-linear relationship that
can be estimated using a Poisson model. Coefficients generate by a Poisson model
can’t be directly interpreted as elasticities. Hence, I additionally estimate the log-
linear relationship using simple OLS estimation after log-transforming the dependent
variable for interpretability and to be able to compare the estimated coefficients to
the results derived by Brülhart et al. (2012). Note that this approach creates missing
observations for municipalities, industries and years with zero firm births which leads
to a substantial loss in usable data points.16 Moreover, interpretation is conditional
on the sample of municipalities with at least one firm of a given industry and year
locating in this municipality. Hence, as firm entry comes at fixed costs and are lost if
the firm exits or relocates in subsequent years, I expect point estimates for a sample
of existing firms to be smaller compared to the full sample. On the other hand,
using a linear relationship allows to control for the relevance of the instruments.
A. Log-Linear Models
Table (3) depicts the results using a log-linear model regressing the log number of
new firms on the (log) local business tax and (log) capital stock of economic promo-
tion. Specification (1) shows the OLS estimate. The effect of taxation and economic
promotion is insignificant. On top, the point estimate for economic promotion is
negative and basically zero. Specification (2) shows the two-stage-least-squares es-
16Approximately 3,000 municipalities are dropped from the regression when taking the logarithm
of firm foundations.
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timates of the variables of interest. First stage results are reported in Table (7) in
Appendix A. The point estimate of the reference tax dummy is positive and sig-
nificant. On top, the capital stock for economic promotion increases with higher
wind strength and agricultural land.17 Using the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rank
F-statistic for weak instruments supports the assumption of valid excluded instru-
ments (in all specifications) as it exceeds a rule-of-thumb value of 10. Moreover,
the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected, which means
the exogeneity of one instrument given the exogeneity of the other cannot be re-
jected. Increasing the local business tax multiplier by 1% decreases the number of
firm foundations (in municipalities with at least one firm foundation) by 1.8%. A
1% increase of the capital stock of economic promotion increases the number of new
firms by 0.24%. The interaction effects are positive but insignificant. To address po-
tential concerns regarding the validity of both instruments I include state times year
fixed effects in specification (3). The point estimates for economic promotion and
the interaction effects are barely affected while the point estimate for the tax rate
drops to 1.07%. As depicted in section III the localization index for the top three
localized industries differ substantially from the average localization. To address
concerns whether the estimates are biased by these potential outliers and to check
for discontinuity of localization I exclude the top 3 and top 5 localized industries
from the analysis. Specifications (4) and (5) depict the results including state times
year fixed effects. The tax effect is negative and significant ranging from −1.25%
to −1.55%. Economic promotion is positive and significant around 0.25%. Most
17Note that the first stage results show that the positive effect of wind strength and agricultural
land is mitigated over time. This is based on the fact that the log-sample does not include
small municipalities and the increase of economic promotion in larger municipalities after 2000
does not persist over time. Using the same instrumentation in the Poisson sample including all
municipalities gives a positive effect over time.
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notably the interaction effect of the tax rate and localization index increases and
turns significant. Hence, with increasing localization the negative effects of taxation
are mitigated. This results are in line with Brülhart et al. (2012). Note that the
interaction effect of economic promotion turns negative but stays insignificant.
Table 3: Log-Linear Models
Dependent Variable: ln(Number of Firm Foundations)
Weighted Localization Index Revenue Weighted Localization Index
Cut Top 3 Cut Top 5 Cut Top 5
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(Local Business Tax) -0.027 -1.800*** -1.070* -1.251** -1.550*** -1.134** -1.613***
(0.041) (0.466) (0.563) (0.564) (0.589) (0.564) (0.612)
LOC X ln(Local Business Tax) 73.782 71.932 173.236** 341.106*** 95.564 313.029***
(88.011) (86.418) (85.426) (117.083) (62.873) (103.271)
ln(Economic Promotion) -0.001 0.238*** 0.230*** 0.245*** 0.223*** 0.252*** 0.252***
(0.003) (0.061) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.073)
LOC X ln(Economic Promotion) 1.896 1.930 -3.056 -5.500 -8.927** -18.626***
(4.878) (4.797) (4.771) (6.391) (3.519) (5.616)
N 257030 257030 257030 256556 241833 257030 230790
log-likelihood -206567.58 -211770.83 -209453.26 -208962.69 -197089.07 -210333.83 -190433.84
F 6.12*** 11.54*** 10.33*** 12.65*** 11.63*** 8.99*** 7.54***
Underidentification LM 346.06 320.48 316.45 298.49 313.68 283.03
Weak Instrument Test† 56.20 53.15 52.52 49.43 52.03 46.76
Hansen p-value 0.61 0.24 0.09 0.52 0.20 0.33
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State X Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Source: Own data collection and calculations. Notes: Economic promotion in one million.
Eicker-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. †Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rank F-statistic for stationary data.
Using an alternative weighting scheme for the localization index (specifications
(6) and (7)) gives comparable results. However, weighting the localization by rev-
enues gives a significant and negative point estimate for the interaction effect of
economic promotion and localization. Hence, the positive effect of economic pro-
motion decreases with localization. Based on the point estimates I conclude that
while the local business tax has a negative and economic promotion has a positive
effect on the number of firm foundations, the sensitivity decreases with increasing
localization economies.
Figures (4a) and (4b) depict the effects of specification (4) and (7) graphically
over the range of localization. As can be seen, for both specifications the negative
tax rate effect decreases with increasing localization and turns insignificant around
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Figure 4: Tax Rate and Economic Promotion Effect (2SLS Estimates)
(a)Weighted Localization Index without the
top 3 localized industries.
(b) Revenue Weighted Localization Index
without the top 5 localized industries.
Notes: The figures depict the effects of a 1% increase in a locations tax rate (bottom line) and
capital stock of economic promotion (top line) on the number of firm foundations in an industry
and year using a log-linear regression. The coefficients are based on the estimates and standard
errors of table (3), speficiations (4) and (7). The shaded areas represent 90% confidence intervals.
0.00175. The point estimate for economic promotion stays positive and significant
over the whole range of localization.
B. Poisson Model
The log-linear models do not use the full sample as municipalities and years with
zero firm foundations are dropped from the regression. Moreover, section IV shows
that firm foundation rates can be adequately modeled using a Poisson model. There-
fore, I estimate the effects of taxation, public expenditures and localization using
a Poisson estimation. Table (4) depicts the estimation results. Specification (1)
depicts the point estimates without instrumenting the endogenous regressors. I
identify a positive and significant effect of economic promotion with a point esti-
mate of 0.003 and a negative and significant effect of the local business tax rate
of 0.001. Thus, both effects behave as expected with an increase in local taxation
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reducing the expected number of firm foundations while additional expenditures for
economic promotion increase the latter. Poisson estimates cannot, unlike the OLS
coefficients, interpreted as marginal effects. However, they can be interpreted as
semielasticities or proportional changes of the expected number of firm foundations.
Taking the estimation equation given by equation (11) and calculating the derivative
with respect to the tax rate Tijt gives18
∂nijt
∂Tijt
= (α1 + α2Lj)nijt
⇒ ∂nijt/nijt
∂Tijt
= (α1 + α2Lj) . (12)
Thus, the effect of an increase of the local business tax rate depends on the strength
of localization in the industry. I find a positive but insignificant effect of the localiza-
tion index and tax rate. On top, I identify a positive and significant point estimate
of the interaction effect of localization and economic promotion. Thus, using simple
Poisson estimation I would conclude that the positive effect of economic promotion
increases with localization. An increase in the mean local business tax rate by 1%
in an industry without localization decreases the expected number of new firm foun-
dations proportional by 0.339% (3.39 × 0.1%). Simultaneously, an increase of the
capital stock of economic promotion by 1% increases the expected number of new
firms in an industry without localization by 0.00423% (0.0141×0.3%) which is close
to zero.
Drawing conclusions on this results are hazardous as expenditures and taxation
are unlikely to be exogenous in the empirical setup. Therefore, from specification
(2) onwards I continue using a control function approach to address the estimation
obstacles of endogenous regressors outlined in section IV. Equations (13) show
18Calculations for the capital stock are analogous.
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the general idea with Y1 the dependent variable, Y2 an endogenous variable, Z the
excluded instruments and X a set of exogenous control variables. Hence, in the first
step I separately regress the local business tax rate, public expenditures and the
interaction effects on the set of excluded instruments and exogenous variables using
simple ordinary least squares regressions and calculate the residuals. In a second
step, I estimate the Poisson model including the endogenous and exogenous variables
as well as the calculated (first stage) residuals. Following Wooldridge (2010) this
method generates unbiased estimates of the point estimates. Standard errors are
bootstrapped with 50 draws to obtain valid standard errors and clustered on the
municipality and industry level to control for violations of the underlying Poisson
distribution.
First Stage (OLS): Y2 = Xβ + Zγ + ν
Second Stage (Poisson): E [Y1|X, Y2] = exp (Xβ + δY2 + ν) (13)
First stage results of equation (13) can be found in Table (8) of Appendix A.19
The point estimates of the excluded instruments behave as expected. Municipalities
with a higher average wind strength and sufficient agricultural land to host wind
power plants show higher expenditures after the RES Act of 2000. On top, the
dummy for the reference tax multiplier is positive. Hence, if municipalities have a
higher taxable capacity compared to 1998 they are more likely to have increased the
current local business tax.
Instrumenting the tax rate increases the point estimate approximately by the
factor 8. An increase of the average local business tax rate by 1% decreases the
expected number of firm foundations in non-localized industries by approximately
19I only report the first stage results of specification (3) of table (4). Note that the results do not
significantly differ between specifications.
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Table 4: Poisson Models
Dependent Variable: Number of Firm Foundations
Weighted Localization Index Revenue Weighted Localization Index
Cut Top 5 Cut Top 5
Poisson CF CF CF CF CF CF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Local Business Tax -0.001*** -0.008*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.015***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
LOC X Local Business Tax 0.020 -0.241 4.931*** 5.111*** 5.172*** 5.365*** 5.404***
(0.069) (1.428) (1.642) (1.725) (1.658) (1.819) (0.948)
Economic Promotion 0.003** 0.072** 0.099*** 0.085**
(0.001) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039)
LOC X Economic Promotion 0.318*** 4.088 -22.773*** - 24.233***
(0.082) (5.369) (5.598) (6.450)
Total Capital Stock 0.013* 0.008
(0.007) (0.006)
LOC X Total Capital Stock -1.518*** -1.475***
(0.396) (0.192)
Expenditures 0.015**
(0.006)
LOC X Expenditures -3.892***
(0.960)
N 2,866,802 2,866,802 2,577,383 2,577,383 2,577,087 2,575,829 2,575,829
Municipality Fixed Effects X X X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X X
State X Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Bootstrapped SE X X X X X X
# of Bootstraps 50 50 50 50 50 50
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Source: Own data collection and calculations. Notes: Bootstrapped and clustered standard
errors are in parentheses.
2.7%. The interaction effect turns negative but stays insignificant. An increase
in average expenditures for economic promotion increase the expected number of
firm foundations in non-localized industries by 0.1%. This is a substantial increase
compared to the uninstrumented specification. The interaction effect stays positive
but turns insignificant. As outlined before, outliers in the localization index are
likely to distort the results of the interaction effects. Therefore, I drop the top
5 localized industries from the analysis. Results are depicted in specification (3).
The point estimates of the local business tax rate and economic promotion are only
marginally affected. On top, the interaction effects increase substantially and turn
significant. Hence, stronger localization mitigates the negative tax effect and the
positive effect of economic promotion. While the expected number of industries
without localization decrease by 4.4% for a 1% increase of the average tax rate
the decrease in industries with strong localization (e.g. 0.001871) is 1.34%. A 1%
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increase of (average) economic promotion increases the expected number of firm
foundations in non-localized industries by 0.13% and in strongly localized industries
by 0.08%. Hence, the stronger the localization within an industry the less sensitive
are firm foundations to an increase in the tax rate or the capital stock of economic
promotion. These results are robust against using a revenue weighted localization
index (see specification (6)).
Additionally, I estimate the effects of the total capital stock using both localiza-
tion indexes (see specifications (4) and (7)). While the point estimates for the local
business tax are unaffected, the point estimates for the total capital stock are some-
what smaller compared to economic promotion. Both are positive and significant.
Hence, a 1% increase of the mean total capital stock increases the expected number
of new firm foundations in a non-localized industry proportional by approximately
0.35% (or 0.24% for a revenue weighted localization index). Both effects decrease
with increasing localization. Thus, as in the regression with economic promotion,
the sensitivity of firm foundations to changes in the total capital stock decreases
with stronger localization in an industry.
To assess the robustness of the empirical setup with respect to my definition of
the capital stock I estimate the model using overall current (voluntary) expenditures
(see specification (5)). The results and implications are comparable to the estimates
using the total capital stock.
Using the conditional-logit interpretation of the Poisson model the estimates can
also be used to predict changes in the probability that a firm chooses municipality i
in industry j at time t if municipalities increase the local business tax or economic
promotion activities. Using the first derivative of the probability given by equation
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Figure 5: Implied Tax and Economic Promotion Effect using a Poisson Model
(a) Local Business Tax Multiplier (b) Economic Promotion
(8) with respect to the local business tax rate (or capital stock) gives
∂Pijt
∂Tit
=
(α1 + α2Lj) e
Uijt
∑
i e
Uijt − (α1 + α2Lj)
(
eUijt
)2
(
∑
i e
Uijt)2
= (α1 + α2Lj)Pijt (1− Pijt) . (14)
Hence, the change in the probability that new firms locate in municipality i at
time t does not only depend on the estimated coefficients α1 and α2 (or β1 and
β2) and the localization index Lj but also on the choice probability that a firm of
industry j is willing to locate in municipality i at time t. Figure (5) depicts (using the
point estimates of specification (3)) the calculated probability changes for different
localization values in a representative municipality and year if the local business
tax rate (figure (5a)) or capital stock of economic promotion (figure (5b)) increase
by 1%.20 A 1% increase in the local business tax rate in Thedinghausen decreases
the probability that a firm of the wholesale and retail trade industry locates in this
20The representative municipality is Thedinghausen (Lower-Saxony) in 2000. It is representative
such that the exogenous variables for this municipality and year are close to the sample mean of
every variable.
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municipality by 1.25%. On the other hand, a 1% increase of the capital stock of
economic promotion increases the probability of a firm in this industry to locate
in Thedinghausen by almost 10%. Although these effects seems substantial at first
glance note that in 2000 no firms of the wholesale and retail trade industry (and only
20 firms in total) located in Thedinghausen. The calculated probability that a firm
of this industry located in this municipality is approximately 0.015%. Both effects
are mitigated by increasing localization economies. The effect on an industry with
strong localization e.g. on firms that provide service activities for business (with a
localization index of 0.001871) is −0.3% or 5.7% receptively. Note that both effects
are insignificant (using a 95% confidence interval).
To sum up, while Poisson regressions do identify a negative effect of an increase
in the local business tax and a positive effect of an increase in economic promotion
activities, both effects decrease with increasing localization economies.21 On top,
both effects turn insignificant for the top localized industries. Thus, localization
can mitigate the negative effects (positive effects) of taxation (public expenditures)
as spillover effects between localized industries become more important and firms
react less sensitive to changes of municipalities policies. In addition, these results
imply that localization creates possibilities for municipalities to tax agglomerations
rents as discussed by Koh et al. (2013).
VI. Results with varying agglomeration indices
As presented in section III the localization index can be constructed for any dis-
tance d. So far, the empirical results use a localization index based on distances
of firms in an industry that lie within the same municipality.22 Hence, it assumes
that localization economies are limited by administrative boundaries. However, the
21The effects are identified if the top 5 localized industries are excluded from the analysis.
22The distance of firms that locate in the same municipality is zero by construction.
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institutional setting in West Germany comprises of many small municipalities and
spillover effects are likely to cross those boundaries.23 The following results estimate
log-linear models (like specification (5) of table (3)) and Poisson models (like spec-
ification (3) of table (4)) using a localization index within distances up to 30km to
control for boundary crossing localization economies.
Table 5: Log-Linear Models with Varying Localization Distance from 5km to 30km.
Dependent Variable: ln(Number of Firm Foundations)
Weighted Localization Index Revenue Weighted Localization Index
5km 10km 30km 5km 10km 30km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Local Business Tax) -1.469** -1.544** -1.701*** -1.505** -1.506** -1.495**
(0.607) (0.609) (0.612) (0.609) (0.610) (0.610)
LOC X ln(Local Business Tax) 65.118* 53.640** 39.227*** 49.089*** 28.411*** 12.175***
(34.331) (22.278) (11.922) (17.491) (9.917) (4.631)
ln(Economic Promotion) 0.205*** 0.219*** 0.265*** 0.240*** 0.247*** 0.268***
(0.072) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074)
LOC X ln(Economic Promotion) 5.704*** 0.793 -2.947*** -3.025*** -2.431*** -1.857***
(1.744) (1.161) (0.639) (0.948) (0.544) (0.258)
N 229370 229370 229370 229370 229370 229370
log-likelihood -187594.23 -188155.17 -189783.38 -188807.70 -189007.27 -189368.59
F 25.48*** 14.07*** 10.38*** 7.44*** 9.60*** 26.24***
Weak Instrument Test† 48.71 48.86 49.15 48.03 48.01 47.96
Hansen p-value 0.55 0.52 0.46 0.32 0.36 0.48
Controls X X X X X X
Municipality Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
State X Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Source: Own data collection and calculations. Notes: Economic promotion in
one million. Eicker-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. †Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rank F-statistic for
stationary data.
Table (5) depicts the results with specification (1) to (3) using a (simple) weighted
average localization index and specifications (4) to (6) using a revenue weighted
localization index applying log-linear regressions (without the top 5 localized indus-
tries). The point estimates for the local business tax and economic promotion are
overall robust against increasing the distance and comparable to the results of Table
(3). A 1% increase of the local business tax rate decreases the expected number of
firm foundations between 1.5% and 1.7% for an industry with no localization. A 1%
23The average area of German municipalities is 29 km2. Assuming that institutional boundaries are
circular, the average municipality has a diameter of 6km. Note however, that this varies greatly
with federal states as the municipality area in my sample ranges from 0.39 km2 (Martinstein) at
the minimum to 357.5 km2 (Neustadt am Rübenberge) at the maximum.
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increase of the stock of economic promotion increases the number of firm founda-
tions in industries without localization by 0.21% to 0.27%. The interaction effect of
localization and the tax rate is positive and significant for all localization indexes.
Hence, firms of an industry with strong localization are less sensitive to changes of
the local business tax. The interaction effect of localization and economic promotion
is positive and significant for the weighted localization index within 5km distance.
It turns negative with increasing distance and is negative and significant for all dis-
tances using a revenue weighted localization index. Thus, the robustness checks find
evidence for both increasing and decreasing sensitivity of firms to expenditures for
economic promotion. However, note that the size of the interaction effect is small
such that the differences in the sensitivity to expenditures for economic promotion
are negligible between weakly and strongly localized industries.
Table 6: Poisson Models with Varying Localization Distance from 5km to 30km
without the top 5 localized industries
Dependent Variable: Number of Firm Foundations
Weighted Localization Index Revenue Weighted Localization Index
5km 10km 30km 5km 10km 30km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local Business Tax -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
LOC X Local Business Tax 0.995*** 0.732*** 0.158 0.976*** 0.651*** 0.104
(0.286) (0.214) (0.158) (0.234) (0.146) (0.134)
Economic Promotion 0.100** 0.090** 0.079* 0.088*** 0.083*** 0.066*
(0.048) (0.040) (0.044) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034)
LOC X Economic Promotion -4.581*** -3.311*** -0.887* -4.365*** -2.881*** -0.611
(0.998) (0.662) (0.501) (0.889) (0.569) (0.383)
N 2,507,724 2,577,383 2,512,080 2,505,564 2,505,564 2,579,973
Municipality Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
State X Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Instrument Controls X X X X X X
Control Function Residuals X X X X X X
Bootstrapped SE X X X X X X
# of Bootstraps 50 50 50 50 50 50
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Source: Own data collection and calculations. Notes: Economic
promotion in one million. Bootstrapped and clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
Additionally, I do control for the robustness of the results using different dis-
tances of the localization index (without the top 5 localized industries) in the Poisson
model. The results are depicted in table (6). Increasing the distance of the local-
ization index for the Poisson models supports the results of the baseline regression.
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All specifications identify a negative effect of the local business tax and a positive
effect of economic promotion (for less localized industries). On top, both effects
decrease with increasing localization. Not that the decrease is smaller the larger the
distance and turns insignificant for localization economies within 30km. The latter
is based on the fact that localization economies within 30km are beneficial for firms
in multiple municipalities. Hence, firms who are willing to set up a firm or move
their existing establishment in another municipality as a reaction to changes in the
local business tax rate or public expenditures still benefit from the same localization
economies. Thus, boundaries crossing localization economies affect the sensitivity
to changes in public policies in the considered locality to a smaller extant.
VII. Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to investigate the sensitivity of firm foundations to changes
of the local business tax and public expenditures (represented by the capital stock
for economic promotion) with respect to the presence of localization economies.
Firms location choice can be modeled using a Poisson model for the number of firm
foundations. This work uses a control function approach to address concerns about
the exogeneity of the tax rate and public expenditures. I do identify a negative
effect of taxation and a positive effect of economic promotion activity (or the total
capital stock). The results imply that for weakly localized industries, a 1% increase
of the average local business tax reduces the expected number of firm foundations
by 4.4%. Simultaneously, a 1% increase of economic promotion activity increases
the expected number of firm foundations by 0.13%. Both effects are mitigated
by increasing localization. The effect of a 1% increase of the tax rate or public
expenditures in top localized industries is 1.34% or 0.08% respectively. Calculating
the changes in the probability of firm foundations in a representative municipality
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for non-localized industries I identify a decrease of 1.25% for a 1% increase of the
local business tax and a 10% increase for a 1% increase in economic promotion
activity. Both effects decrease and turn insignificant for strongly localized industries.
Hence, I conclude that the sensitivity to changes of the local business tax and public
expenditures decrease with increasing localization economies. These results confirm
the hypotheses tested by Brülhart et al. (2012).
This work contributes to the open discussion on strategic tax setting of local
governments. Theoretical work predicts a “race to the bottom” of local tax rates if
jurisdictions compete for mobile capital (see Wilson 1999, for a review). While many
empirical tests of this theory find contradicting results (Buettner 2003, Baskaran
2014), the literature on “new economic geography” might provide answers. This work
contributes as it quantifies the reduction in the sensitivity of firms to changes of local
tax rates and public expenditures. If the sensitivity decreases significantly and turns
insignificant for strongly localized industries competition among local governments
for mobile capital is suspended. Hence, further reduction of the tax rate does not
necessarily increase the number of firm foundations and stops the race. Moreover,
the positive effects of public expenditures are limited by localization economies and
thus might set a natural limit to the effectiveness of public investment to foster
regional growth.
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Appendix A: First Stage Regressions
Table 7: First Stage of the Log-Linear Regression
Dependent Variable ln(Tax) LOC X ln(Tax) ln(EP) LOC X ln(EP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wind X ln(AGR) X Reform 0.0003** -0.0000*** 0.0031*** -0.0001***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000)
LOC X Wind X ln(AGR) X Reform 0.0681 0.0044*** 0.0520 0.1111***
(0.0425) (0.0004) (0.1820) (0.0030)
Wind X ln(AGR) X Reform X Trend -0.0001*** -0.0000** -0.0023*** -0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
LOC X Wind X ln(AGR) X Reform X Trend -0.0231 0.0000 -0.0119 -0.0010
(0.0151) (0.0001) (0.0496) (0.0008)
Reference Tax Dummy 0.0265*** 0.0001*** 0.0248*** 0.0010***
(0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0084) (0.0001)
LOC X Reference Tax Dummy 0.1009 -0.0697*** -0.8597 -0.9617***
(0.3197) (0.0017) (1.4779) (0.0215)
ln(Population in 1000) 0.0094 0.0000 0.0761* 0.0003
(0.0361) (0.0001) (0.0457) (0.0003)
ln(Unemployment Rate) 0.0042*** 0.0000 0.1500*** 0.0002***
(0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0092) (0.0001)
Share Low Qualified Workers in % -0.0009*** -0.0000 0.0457*** 0.0000***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0018) (0.0000)
Share Medium Qualified Workers in % 0.0005 0.0000 0.0289*** 0.0000**
(0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0014) (0.0000)
Share High Qualified Workers in % -0.0015*** -0.0000 0.0518*** 0.0000**
(0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0032) (0.0000)
ln(Students) -0.0030*** -0.0000** -0.0183*** -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0029) (0.0000)
ln(Doctors) -0.0266*** -0.0000** -0.0505* -0.0003
(0.0027) (0.0000) (0.0263) (0.0002)
Wind X Reform -0.0169*** 0.0000 0.0087 0.0008***
(0.0039) (0.0000) (0.0060) (0.0000)
Wind X Reform X Trend 0.0042*** 0.0000*** 0.0070*** -0.0000**
(0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0012) (0.0000)
LOC X Wind X Reform -0.5816 -0.0348*** -0.7469 -0.8334***
(0.3679) (0.0037) (1.4469) (0.0231)
LOC X Wind X Reform X Trend 0.1946 0.0014* 0.1603 0.0254***
(0.1240) (0.0008) (0.3905) (0.0061)
N 257,030 257,030 257,030 257,030
F-Statistic 175.21*** 269.21*** 93.47*** 526.35***
Municipality Fixed Effects X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X
State X Year Fixed Effects X X X X
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Source: Own data collection and calculations. Notes: The results depict
the point estimates of the first stage of specification (3) of Table 3. Economic promotion (EP) is expressed in
one million and local business tax (Tax) in points. Eicker-White robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 8: First Stage of the Poisson Regression
Dependent Variable: Tax LOC X Tax EP LOC X EP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reference Tax Dummy 10.8093*** 0.0232*** 0.0181*** 0.0009***
(0.0562) (0.0003) (0.0048) (0.0001)
LOC X Reference Tax Dummy -0.0000 -12.9794*** 0.0000 -0.8793***
(7.4788) (0.0365) (0.6385) (0.0074)
Wind X AGR X Reform -0.0331*** -0.0003*** 0.0071*** -0.0001***
(0.0017) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Wind X AGR X Reform X Trend -0.0076*** -0.0000*** 0.0015*** -0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
LOC X Wind X AGR X Reform -0.0000 0.2599*** 0.0000 0.1209***
(0.6987) (0.0034) (0.0597) (0.0007)
LOC X Wind X AGR X Reform X Trend 0.0000 0.0275*** -0.0000 0.0018***
(0.1903) (0.0009) (0.0162) (0.0002)
Wind X Reform -128.5501*** 0.6037*** -15.5336*** 0.1898***
(26.0739) (0.1272) (2.2261) (0.0259)
Wind X Reform X Trend 285.8619*** -0.0175 -15.0772*** -0.0170***
(4.8437) (0.0236) (0.4135) (0.0048)
LOC X Wind X Reform 0.0001 -747.5128*** -0.0000 -210.1636***
(2177.1000) (10.6208) (185.8736) (2.1641)
LOC X Wind X Reform X Trend -0.0000 303.8484*** 0.0000 2.3588***
(464.5249) (2.2661) (39.6596) (0.4618)
Population in 1000 -0.0133 -0.0000 -0.0727*** -0.0001***
(0.0197) (0.0001) (0.0017) (0.0000)
Unemployment Rate 0.2182*** 0.0002*** -0.0057*** -0.0000
(0.0091) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0000)
Share Low Qualified Workers in % -0.0976*** -0.0001 0.0007 0.0000
(0.0119) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0000)
Share Medium Qualified Workers in % 0.0995*** 0.0001** 0.0055*** 0.0000
(0.0091) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0000)
Share High Qualified Workers in % 0.3486*** 0.0003*** 0.1799*** 0.0002***
(0.0190) (0.0001) (0.0016) (0.0000)
Students 0.0118*** 0.0000 0.0149*** 0.0000***
(0.0026) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Doctors -0.0322*** -0.0000*** 0.0025*** 0.0000*
(0.0013) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
N 2,866,802 2,866,802 2,866,802 2,866,802
F-Statistic 2789.44*** 14912.60*** 2122.52*** 8875.69***
Municipality Fixed Effects X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X
State X Year Fixed Effects X X X X
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Source: Own data collection and calculations. Notes: The results
depict the point estimates of the first stage of specification (2) of Table 4. Economic promotion (EP) is
expressed in one million and local business tax (Tax) in points. Eicker-White robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Appendix B: Full Estimation Tables
Table 9: Complete Log-Linear Models
Dependent Variable: ln(Number of Firm Foundations)
Weighted Localization Index Revenue Weighted Localization Index
Cut Top 3 Cut Top 5 Cut Top 5
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(Local Business Tax) -0.027 -1.800*** -1.070* -1.251** -1.550*** -1.134** -1.613***
(0.041) (0.466) (0.563) (0.564) (0.589) (0.564) (0.612)
LOC X ln(Local Business Tax) 73.782 71.932 173.236** 341.106*** 95.564 313.029***
(88.011) (86.418) (85.426) (117.083) (62.873) (103.271)
ln(Economic Promotion) -0.001 0.238*** 0.230*** 0.245*** 0.223*** 0.252*** 0.252***
(0.003) (0.061) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.073)
LOC X ln(Economic Promotion) 1.896 1.930 -3.056 -5.500 -8.927** -18.626***
(4.878) (4.797) (4.771) (6.391) (3.519) (5.616)
ln(Population in 1000) -0.049 -0.082 -0.053 -0.059 -0.062 -0.048 -0.066
(0.059) (0.084) (0.070) (0.073) (0.079) (0.071) (0.082)
ln(Unemployment Rate) -0.007 -0.067*** -0.020 -0.021 -0.014 -0.020 -0.019
(0.012) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Share of Low Skilled Workers in % -0.002 -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Share of Medium Skilled Workers in % 0.008*** -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Share of High Skilled Workers in % -0.009** -0.023*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.022***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
ln(Students) -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
ln(Doctors) -0.029 -0.080* -0.019 -0.022 -0.028 -0.021 -0.029
(0.041) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.048)
Wind X Ref -0.036*** -0.015 -0.015 -0.020 -0.015 -0.021*
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Wind X Ref X Trend 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
LOC X Wind X Ref 0.091 0.188 0.279 2.460*** 0.525 3.581***
(0.446) (0.436) (0.438) (0.624) (0.326) (0.639)
LOC X Wind X Ref X Trend -0.689*** -0.708*** -0.851*** -1.280*** -0.398*** -0.915***
(0.097) (0.095) (0.093) (0.131) (0.070) (0.134)
N 257030 257030 257030 256556 241833 257030 230790
log-likelihood -206567.58 -211770.83 -209453.26 -208962.69 -197089.07 -210333.83 -190433.84
F 6.12*** 11.54*** 10.33*** 12.65*** 11.63*** 8.99*** 7.54***
Underidentification LM 346.06 320.48 316.45 298.49 313.68 283.03
Weak Instrument Test† 56.20 53.15 52.52 49.43 52.03 46.76
Hansen p-value 0.61 0.24 0.09 0.52 0.20 0.33
Municipality Fixed Effects X X X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X X
State X Year Fixed Effects X X X X X
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Source: Own data collection and calculations. Notes: Economic promotion in one million. Eicker-White
robust standard errors are in parentheses. †Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rank F-statistic for stationary data.
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Table 10: Complete Poisson Models
Dependent Variable: Number of Firm Foundations
Weighted Localization Index Revenue Weighted Localization Index
Cut Top 5 Cut Top 5
Poisson CF CF CF CF CF CF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Local Business Tax -0.001*** -0.008*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.015***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
LOC X Local Business Tax 0.020 -0.241 4.931*** 5.111*** 5.172*** 5.365*** 5.404***
(0.069) (1.428) (1.642) (1.725) (1.658) (1.819) (0.948)
Economic Promotion 0.003** 0.072** 0.099*** 0.085**
(0.001) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039)
LOC X Economic Promotion 0.318*** 4.088 -22.773*** - 24.233***
(0.082) (5.369) (5.598) (6.450)
Total Capital Stock 0.013* 0.008
(0.007) (0.006)
LOC X Total Capital Stock -1.518*** -1.475***
(0.396) (0.192)
Expenditures 0.015**
(0.006)
LOC X Expenditures -3.892***
(0.960)
Population in 1000 0.006** 0.010** 0.010** -0.011 -0.001 0.009* -0.004
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010)
Unemployment Rate 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Share Low Qualified Worker in % 0.012** 0.010 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Share Medium Qualified Worker in % 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Share High Qualified Worker in % -0.008 -0.016 -0.027* -0.019 -0.011 -0.024* -0.016
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Students 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Doctors 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001* 0.001* 0.002*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 2,866,802 2,866,802 2,577,383 2,577,383 2,577,087 2,575,829 2,575,829
Municipality Fixed Effects X X X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X X
State X Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X X
Instrument Controls X X X X X X
Control Function Residuals X X X X X X
Bootstrapped SE X X X X X X
# of Bootstraps 50 50 50 50 50 50
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Source: Own data collection and calculations. Notes: Economic promotion in one million. Bootstrapped
and clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 11: Complete Log-Linear Models with Varying Localization Distance from
5km to 30km.
Dependent Variable: ln(Number of Firm Foundations)
Weighted Localization Index Revenue Weighted Localization Index
5km 10km 30km 5km 10km 30km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Local Business Tax) -1.469** -1.544** -1.701*** -1.505** -1.506** -1.495**
(0.607) (0.609) (0.612) (0.609) (0.610) (0.610)
LOC X ln(Local Business Tax) 65.118* 53.640** 39.227*** 49.089*** 28.411*** 12.175***
(34.331) (22.278) (11.922) (17.491) (9.917) (4.631)
ln(Economic Promotion) 0.205*** 0.219*** 0.265*** 0.240*** 0.247*** 0.268***
(0.072) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074)
LOC X ln(Economic Promotion) 5.704*** 0.793 -2.947*** -3.025*** -2.431*** -1.857***
(1.744) (1.161) (0.639) (0.948) (0.544) (0.258)
ln(Population in 1000) -0.078 -0.078 -0.082 -0.067 -0.068 -0.073
(0.079) (0.080) (0.082) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
ln(Unemployment Rate) -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.019 -0.020
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Share of Low Skilled Workers in % -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Share of Medium Skilled Workers in % -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Share of High Skilled Workers in % -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.023***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
ln(Students) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ln(Doctors) -0.024 -0.026 -0.030 -0.029 -0.029 -0.030
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Wind X Reform -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Wind X Reform X Trend 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
LOC X Wind X Reform 0.848*** 0.622*** 0.409*** 0.599*** 0.347*** 0.164***
(0.212) (0.136) (0.071) (0.109) (0.062) (0.029)
LOC X Wind X Reform X Trend -0.490*** -0.276*** -0.112*** -0.154*** -0.073*** -0.018***
(0.045) (0.029) (0.015) (0.023) (0.013) (0.006)
N 229370 229370 229370 229370 229370 229370
log-likelihood -187594.23 -188155.17 -189783.38 -188807.70 -189007.27 -189368.59
F 25.48*** 14.07*** 10.38*** 7.44*** 9.60*** 26.24***
Weak Instrument Test† 48.71 48.86 49.15 48.03 48.01 47.96
Hansen p-value 0.55 0.52 0.46 0.32 0.36 0.48
Municipality Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
State X Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Source: Own data collection and calculations. Notes: Economic promotion in one
million. Eicker-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. †Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rank F-statistic for stationary
data.
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Table 12: Complete Poisson Models with Varying Localization Distance from 5km
to 30km without the top 5 localized industries
Dependent Variable: Number of Firm Foundations
Weighted Localization Index Revenue Weighted Localization Index
5km 10km 30km 5km 10km 30km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local Business Tax -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
LOC X Local Business Tax 0.995*** 0.732*** 0.158 0.976*** 0.651*** 0.104
(0.286) (0.214) (0.158) (0.234) (0.146) (0.134)
Economic Promotion 0.100** 0.090** 0.079* 0.088*** 0.083*** 0.066*
(0.048) (0.040) (0.044) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034)
LOC X Economic Promotion -4.581*** -3.311*** -0.887* -4.365*** -2.881*** -0.611
(0.998) (0.662) (0.501) (0.889) (0.569) (0.383)
Population in 1000 0.010** 0.009** 0.009* 0.009** 0.008** 0.008**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Unemployment Rate 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Share Low Skilled Workers 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Share Medium Skilled Workers 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Share High Skilled Workers -0.027** -0.024 -0.017 -0.024* -0.022* -0.014
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010)
Doctors 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Students 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 2,507,724 2,577,383 2,512,080 2,505,564 2,505,564 2,579,973
Municipality Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
State X Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Instrument Controls X X X X X X
Control Function Residuals X X X X X X
Bootstrapped SE X X X X X X
# of Bootstraps 50 50 50 50 50 50
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Source: Own data collection and calculations. Notes: Economic promotion
in one million. Bootstrapped and clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
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